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PRIMARY LIABILITY UNDER EXCESS INSURANCE CLAUSES:
STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE CO. V. MUTUAL ASSURANCE
SOCIETY AGAINST FIRE ON BUILDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance is a contract by which the insurer undertakes to indemnify the
insured against loss arising from the destruction of or injury to the in-
sured's property as a result of certain causes.' By its very nature an in-
demnity contract obligates the insurer to reimburse the insured for the
amount of actual loss suffered by the insured.2 There are, however, situa-
tions in which multiple insurance coverage exists; that is, the same interest
and the same risk are insured at the same time by more than one separate
and distinct insurance contract, each presumably liable in the event of loss
of or destruction to the insurable interest.3 Where multiple insurance ex-
ists, a loss occurs, and every policy meets its obligation to reimburse the
insured for loss suffered, the insured gets a windfall, and the indemnity
principle underlying the insurance concept is violated.' A perplexing prob-
lem then arises in determining which insurer should be held primarily
liable for reimbursing the insured for the loss suffered, and, if all insurers
are primarily liable, how to apportion the loss among them.
In response to this problem, insurance companies developed form insur-
1. Continental Cas. Co. v. Fleming, 46 Ill. App. 2d 276, 197 N.E.2d 88 (1964). Brand
Distrib., Ins. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 532 F. 2d 352 (4th Cir. 1976). See also R. KEETON,
INSURANCE LAw § 1.2(a)-(b) (1971) [hereinafter cited as Keeton] where the author provides
a seven prong test for determining what constitutes insurance, and W. VANCE and B. ANDER-
SON, VANCE ON INSURANCE § 1 (3d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as VANCE] where a five prong
test for establishing an insurance contract is set forth.
2. Brand, 532 F.2d at 359. Note that, if the insured has a valued policy which is clearly
stated as such, the face amount of the policy will be reimbursed. A valued policy is one in
which an agreed value is fixed on the property and, in the event of loss, the stated value is
paid regardless of the amount of actual loss. In order to constitute a valued policy, the policy,
on its face, must state specifically that it is intended to be a valued policy. Houston Fire and
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 435 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1968).
3. Smith v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 232 App. Div. 354, 250 N.Y.S. 30 (1931). Note that
dual or multiple insurance must be distinguished from insurance coverage procured by two
parties on the same property but where each has a separate interest in the property, i.e.,
mortgagor-mortgagee or vendor-vendee. This does not constitute multiple insurance as
used in this article. However, two people may have more than one distinct policy, but if those
policies cover the same interest it is multiple insurance. The most common example of this
is a permissive user of an automobile who is covered by both the insurance procured by the
owner of the auto which is applicable to him under the omnibus clause and his own insurance.
4. The indemnity principle, as a general rule, has no application to life, accident, health,
and medical insurance. Policies covering these areas are absolute, and the insurer agrees to
pay the face value of the policy even though other similar coverage exists. Keckly v. Coshoc-
ton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N.E. 299 (1912).
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ance contracts which contained restrictive clauses.' Initially, these took the
form of "moral hazard" clauses.' The intent was to preclude the insurer's
liability under the contract in the event that a claim arose if the insured
had any other insurance contract covering the same insurable interest at
the time of the loss.' The "moral hazard" clause was subsequently dis-
placed as a standard feature of insurance contracts in favor of the no
liability clause,' the pro rata clause,' or the excess insurance clause. ' These
latter clauses remain the predominant form of restrictive clauses found in
the standard insurance contract today.
The object of these clauses was to implement the principle of indemnity"1
and to reduce the incidence of moral hazard due to over insurance. 12 How-
ever, because nearly all standard insurance contracts included some form
of restrictive clause, there was an increase in insurance litigation focusing
on the construction of these clauses when multiple insurance existed to
5. A restrictive clause is merely a clause in an insurance contract which purports to limit
the liability of the insurance company.
6. VANCE, supra note 1, at § 144. At 840 Vance reprints a typical "moral hazard" clause as
follows: "Unless otherwise provided by agreement in writing added hereto this Company shall
not be liable for loss of damage occurring while the insured shall have any other contract of
insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole or in part by this policy."
7. Id.
8. KEEroN, supra note 1, at § 3.11(a). The author illustrates a typical no liability clause
by citing lines 25 to 27 of the New York Standard Fire Insurance policy: "Other insurance
may be prohibited or the amount of insurance may be limited by endorsement attached
hereto." See also N.Y. Ins. Law § 168(1) (McKinney 1966).
9. KETON, supra note 8. A standard pro rata clause is illustrated by lines 86 to 89 of the
New York Standard Fire Insurance policy: "This Company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance
covering the property against the peril involved, whether collectible or not."
10. Language exemplifying an excess insurance clause is: "If there is any other insurance
available to the insured there shall be no insurance afforded hereuder, except that if the
applicable limit of liability of this policy is in excess of the applicable limit provided by the
other insurance available this policy shall afford excess insurance." Insurance Co. of America
v. State Farm Ins. Co., of 75 Wash. 2d 200, 499 P.2d 391 (1969). See also 44 Am. Jur. 2d
INSURANCE § 1815 which has a similar clause.
11. Myers, Insurance, 4 St. Mary's L. J. 444, 445 (1975). Basically, the insurance compa-
nies are attempting to limit recovery to a specific amount.
12. 8 APPLEMAN INSuRANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4912 n.15. [hereinafter cited as Apple-
man]. Keeton and Vance both state that, after loss or destruction of the property, the jury
is unable to examine it and fix its proper value. To the dishonest person this presents a
temptation to intentionally destroy the insured property which is known to be over-insured
with the intent of recovering insurance proceeds greater than the actual value of the insured"
property. While the honest person may not succumb to this temptation, he, nevertheless, is
aware of the over-insurance and his awareness of the potential recovery in the event of loss
or destruction may result in the insured not exercising as great an amount of care and
diligence in protecting the property as he normally would. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 3.11(a),
and VANCE, supra note 1, at § 144.
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cover the insured's loss and each policy contained such a clause purporting
to limit its liability for the loss.'" A strict and literal construction of the
restrictive clauses in each policy where multiple coverage exists would
result in the absence of valid coverage for the insured in spite of the fact
that in the absence of these clauses each insurer would be liable.'4 To avoid
this harsh result, the courts have fashioned rules to resolve conflicts be-
tween restrictive clauses in two or more insurance contracts which cover
the same interest and to afford the insured coverage consistent with the
indemnity principle."
This article examines the resolution of this conflict where multiple insur-
ance policies each contain an excess insurance clause." The examination
includes a discussion of how various jurisdictions resolve the conflict, the
rationales involved, and the methods of loss apportionment available. The
focus then shifts to the state of the law in Virginia and a review of the most
recent developments in the relevant Virginia case law.
II. THE VARYING POSITIONS ON ExcESs INSURANCE CLAUSES
As noted above, when there is multiple insurance coverage of the same
insurable interest and each policy contains an excess insurance clause, a
literal construction of these clauses precludes coverage by either policy
13. Generally, the various restrictive clauses are not found in life, health, accident, medical
or hospital insurance. Keeton opines that the reasons for their absence in these forms of
insurance are that the indemnity principle is not as strictly applied in these areas and because
the risk of over-insurance on an individual's life is not as great as it is with insurance on other
interests. KEarON, supra note 1, at § 3.11(a).
14. Comment, "Other Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 Stanford L. Rev. 147, 148 (1952).
15. If the conflict in other insurance clauses arises between an excess insurance clause in
one policy and a no liability clause in the other policy the courts generally hold that the no
liability clause is inoperative, that the excess insurance clause is operative, and that the
policy containing the former is primarily liable. The rationale is that the policy containing
the excess liability clause is not valid collectible insurance so as to trigger the no liability
clause, therefore it is ineffective. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters, 34 Ill.
2d 424, 216 N.E. 2d 665 (1966). Note that there is a minority rule stating that the policy first
in time is primary. Kearns Coal Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 118 F.2d 33
(2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied. 313 U.S. 579 (1941). Where the conflict between the clauses in
the double insurance coverage policies involves no liability and a pro rata clause, the courts
generally find the pro rata clause without effect making that policy primarily liable. McFar-
land v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952). If a conflict arises between a pro
rata clause in one policy and an excess insurance clause in a second policy, the courts
disregard the proration clause, honor the excess insurance clause and hold the policy with
the proration clause primarily liable. Vianca v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706
(1972). Where two proration clauses are in conflict, the courts generally give both of them
effect. Continental Cas. Co. v. Fleming, 46 Ill. App.2d 276, 197 N.E.2d 88 (1964); Consoli-
dated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 169, 114 P.2d 34 (1941).
16. See note 6 supra.
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resulting in the insured being without valid coverage.' 7 Just as the courts
have constructed rules to resolve conflicts between other inconsistent re-
strictive clauses,'8 the courts have refused to invalidate otherwise valid
insurance p6licies merely because each contained a boilerplate excess in-
surance clause." The general rule has been to hold each insurance policy
primarily liable,2" and not as excess insurance. This rule extends to instan-
ces in which the policies were procured by different persons on the same
insurable interest .2 Courts have found little difficulty in rationalizing
these results. The difficulty, however, lies in the method of loss apportion-
ment among the multiple insurance carriers.
Apparently, the majority rule involves proration of liability.2 Most juris-
dictions hold the conflicting excess insurance clauses to be mutually repug-
nant and therefore inoperative so as to trigger coverage by each policy.
The rationale underlying this conclusion varies, however, among jurisdic-
tions. Some courts hold that it was not the intent of the parties to provide
that a subsequent policy should void the first;" others state that an at-
tempt to construe the policies in order to hold one primarily liable and the
other(s) secondarily liable would involve circuity of reasoning and dubiety
of obligations;2 still others opine that holding one policy primarily liable
and the other(s) secondarily liable would be to add non-existent terms;2'
and a last group holds that neither policy, by its terms, provides for pri-
mary coverage because they are impossible of accomplishment.2 At least
17. This occurs if the courts give the clause a literal interpretation and application, since
both are excess insurance coverage they offer no coverage at all in the absence of a primarily
liable policy. See note 14 supra.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Federal Am. Ins. Co., 76 Wash. 2d 249, 456 P.2d 331 (1969). See
167 N.W. 2d 163 (1969).
20. Id. See also Federal Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 29 A.D. 2d 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d
212, rev'd., 25 N.Y.2d 71, 302 N.Y.S.2d 769, 250 N.E.2d 193 (1969); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Union Ins. Co., 181 Neb. 253, 147 N.W.2d 760 (1967).
21. Continental Cas. Co. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co., 179 F. Supp.
535 (D. Ore. 1960); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Federated Am. Ins. Co., 7 Wash. App. 241, 499 P.2d
247 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wash. 2d 412, 511 P.2d 56 (1973). Generally, dual insurance coverage
where there are two persons procuring the policy arises in cases involving a permissible
permittee and an omnibus clause. Cosompolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28
N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959).
22. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 496, 492 P.2d 673, 99 Cal. Rptr.
617 (1972).
23. See notes 24-27 infra.
24. Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 506 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1975).
25. Continental Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 224 Tenn. 306, 454 S.W.2d
709 (1970).
26. Id.
27. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959).
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one other jurisdiction adheres to the proration method but simply holds
each insurer liable for his pro rata share without resort to the repugnance
rationale."
There is a minority trend which holds that the excess insuranceclause
of each policy is repugnant to such clause of the other(s) rendering each
inoperative, but, rather than prorating the lost," the insurers are obligated
to share the loss incurred." Another minority view deems the mutually
non-covering excess insurance clauses repugnant and holds each insurer
fully liable to the insured.3 1
The actual apportionment of the loss among the multiple insurance
carriers presents no difficulty to courts adhering to the minority views
referred to above,32 since the former requires an equal distribution of the
loss among the insurance companies and the latter full liability of each
company.Y Keeton, however, recognizes four distinct methods of proration
of the loss insured by two or more companies.
34
Where the policies to be prorated are of equal face value, proration is
realized merely by dividing the loss equally among the insurers.3 1 If the face
value of the policies differs, then the court can prorate the loss by (1)
holding each company equally liable up to the face value of the policy;3'
(2) comparing the premiums paid on each policy;37 or (3) holding each
insurer liable for the loss proportionate to the face value of the policy.38 The
last method is the most widely recognized.
28. Federal Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l. Ins. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d 212
(1968).
29. See note 22 supra.
30. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Union Ins. Co., 181 Neb. 253, 147 N.W. 2d 760
(1967).
31. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., v. Sonesta Int. Hotels Corp., 313 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App.
1975).
32. See notes 29 and 30 supra.
33. Id.
34. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 3.11(b).
35. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 167 N.W.2d 163 (1969).
36. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959).
37. Insurance Co. of Tex. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal.
1958). The court stated that in its opinion it is more equitable to prorate liability according
to premiums paid. The rates for the first twenty-five or fifty thousand dollars of liability
insurance are higher than the charge for an additional fifty thousand or million dollars. Id.
at 147. But see Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d
529, 534 (1959). The court rejected the premium method of apportionment because there are
too many variables affecting premiums to permit them to form an adequate basis for an
equitable adjustment.
38. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 245 Or. 30, 420 P.2d 66 (1966). Each insur-
ance company's share of the loss is that proportion of its coverage of its policy to the total
1978]
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Where proration is the appropriate method of loss apportionment, the
insured has the right to look to either insurer for satisfaction of this obliga-
tion.39 The insurers are severally, not jointly, liable." If the insured seeks
full payment by one insurer and if the insurer responds by satisfying the
claim, then that insurer has a right to contribution from the other insur-
er(s).4' The various methods of loss apportionment discussed above are
then aplied in determining the amount of contribution.
m. THE POSITION IN VIRGINIA
Until recently,"2 neither the Supreme Court of Virginia nor the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Virginia law,4 3 had the opportunity to
decide a multiple insurance case in which each policy contained an excess
insurance clause." The state of the law was unsettled. Apparently, when
such conflicts arose in the past in this jurisdiction, they were resolved
either informally or at the trial court level.
In State Capital Insurance Co. v. Mutual Assurance Society Against Fire
on Buildings,5 the Virginia Supreme Court, in a case of first impression,
coverage afforded by all valid and collectible policies. For example, the plaintiff Liberty
Mutual had a policy limit of $25,000 and the defendant Truck a policy limit of $100,000-total
coverage $125,000. Liberty's liability is 1/5 ($25,000/125,000) of the loss, whereas Truck's
share of the loss is 4/5 (100,000/125,000).
39. Clow v. National Indem. Co., 54 Wash.2d 198, 339 P.2d 82 (1959).
40. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 18 F. Supp. 707 (1937).
41. United States Guarantee Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 12 N.W. 2d 59
(1944). The fact that an insurer who is subject to suit to force payment of an obligation pays
the obligation does not make it a voluntary payment so as to preclude contribution. See note
39 supra.
42. See State Capital Ins. Co. v. The Mutual Assurance Soc'y Against Fire on Buildings,
- Va. _ 241 S.E.2d 759 (1978).
43. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 490 F.2d
407 (4th Cir. 1974), applying West Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit found an escape (no
liability) clause repugnant to an excess insurance clause and prorated the loss among the two
insurers. The implication is that, if the Fourth Circuit were to be faced wit;h a case involving
conflicting excess insurance clauses, it would find them mutually repugnant and apportion
the loss by proration among the two insurers. This assumption can reasonably be extended
to Virginia cases even though the court has not been faced with such a case.
44. Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have dealt
with other conflicting restrictive clauses where dual insurance exists. Generally, these cases
involved an excess insurance clause in conflict with a no liability clause in a situaion in which
the omnibus clause was applicable. The courts honor the excess insurance clause but hold
the no liability clause void as being repugnant to the omnibus clause of VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-
381(a)(Cum. Supp. 1978). See American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Kaplan, 209 Va. 53, 161 S.E.2d
675 (1968); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Va. 60, 161 S.E.2d 680
(1968); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co., 212 Va. 15, 181 S.E.2d 615
(1971).
45. - Va. - , 241 S.E.2d 759 (1978).
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was faced with this issue. State Capital involved a boating accident in
which a swimmer sustained injuries. The individual operating the boat
which caused the injury was a permissive user and not the owner of the
boat. He was covered by three separate and distinct insurance policies."
Two policies were standard homeowner policies, protecting the 'amed
insured and any relatives resident in his household from personal liability
for bodily injury and property.47 The third policy was issued to the boat
owner. Each policy contained a standard excess insurance clause purport-
ing to limit its liability to excess insurance where other valid and collecti-
ble insurance was available to the insured.
The injured party sued the boat operator, and the three insurance com-
panies agreed to a $30,000 settlement. Each company reserved the right
to litigate the issue of liability. Two insurance companies-State Capital
Insurance Co. and The Mutual Insurance Co. of Fredrick, Maryland (here-
inafter referred to as State Capital and Frederick, respec-
tively)-instituted suit on the issue of liability against the insurance com-
pany that issued the policy to the boat owner-The Mutual Assurance
Society Against Fire on Buildings (hereinafter referred to as Mutual).4"
State Capital and Frederick claimed that Mutual was primarily liable.
The trial court held for Mutual and prorated the loss.49 Only State Capital
appealed.50 Their argument was that Section 38.1-381(a) of the Code of
Virginia required a boat policy to contain a provision insuring the named
insured and any other 5erson using the boat and that Section 38.1-381 (a)
(2) of the Code of Virginia voids any endorsement, provision, or rider that
attempts to limit or reduce the coverage afforded by the former statute.
State Capital argued that the policy issued by Mutual to the boat owner
was a boat policy within the scope of Section 38.1-381 of the Code of
Virginia.
The Virginia Supreme Court construed the policy to be a general liabil-
ity policy,' and, thus, not governed by the specific code section. Accord-
46. The companies were State Capital Insurance Co., The Mutual Insurance Co. of Freder-
ick, Maryland, and The Mutual Assurance Society Against Fire on Buildings. The policies
provided coverage of $25,000, $100,000, and $50,000 respectively.
47. 241 S.E.2d at 760.
48. Initially the suits for contribution were separate, but they were consolidated. Id.
49. Each company was liable proportionately 1/7, 4/7, 2/7. Id.
50. Id.
51. State Capital claimed that Mutual's policy was a specific boat policy rather than a
general liability policy because the latter's policy contained a special watercraft endorsement
which provided coverage for boats with oversized engines. The general policy offered by
Mutual covered boats but only up to a specified engine size. The boat involved in this case
had an oversized engine which precipitated the endorsement. The court held that the endorse-
ment did not render the policy a specific policy of the boat in question so as to invoke VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(a) and (a)(2)(Cum. Supp. 1978). 241 S.E.2d at 761.
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ingly, each policy's excess insurance clause was operative, and a literal
application would leave the insured without valid and collectible cover-
age. 2 The court, however, adopted the majority view and stated that "the
two excess insurance clauses, therefore, are in irreconcilable conflict with
one another. In this situation both must be disregarded, with the result
that neither policy provides primary coverage for the loss in question."53
The court then affirmed, without further discussion or elaboration, the
trial court's decision to prorate the loss proportionately among the three
insurance companies.54
In rendering this decision the Virginia Supreme Court did not settle with
finality in Virginia this area of the law which has generated vast amounts
of litigation in other jurisdictions. The unusual and unsettling aspect of
this case is that the court devoted very little of its opinion to the resolution
of the conflict between the excess insurance clauses and the method of loss
apportionment.
The court clearly adopted the majority view that the mutually non-
covering excess insurance clauses are inoperative, but it did not offer any
underlying rationale or public policy statements to support or justify its
adoption of this stance. This aspect of the decision was based on a single
Georgia case as precedent.
51
The finding and apparent adoption of the proration method of loss ap-
portionment was not an independent decision on the Virginia Supreme
Court's part. State Capital based its appeal on the validity of Mutual's
excess insurance clause. 6 The court reasoned that "[i]mplicit in State
Capital's position is the concession that, if Mutual of Virginia's policy did
not specially insure the specific boat in quesion, then the policy was not
subject to the requirements of § 38.1-381." ' The court concluded stating:
Also implicit in State Capital's position is the concession that, if the Mutual
of Virginia policy did not provide primary coverage for the loss involved in
this case, then the pro rata distribution ordered by the trial court was appro-
priate. Accordingly, because we find no error in the trial court's ruling that
Mutual of Virginia was not primarily liable for the loss, we affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.5
52. 241 S.E.2d at 762.
53. Id.
54. See note 31 supra.
55. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Holton, 131 Ga. App. 247, 248, 2()5 S.E. 2d 872, 874
(1974).
56. 241 S.E.2d at 760.
57. 241 S.E.2d at 761.
58. 241 S.E.2d at 762.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While at first glance, the Virginia Supreme Court resolved the issue
of multiple insurance coverage among insurance carriers, a closer examina-
tion reveals that, even though the resolution of the dual insurance elauses
was addressed, the issue of loss apportionment was never at issue. The
issue on appeal was the applicability of Section 38.1-381 (a)(2) of the Code
of Virginia. State Capital conceded that the trial court's decision to employ
a pro rata apportionment of the loss was proper if Section 38.1-381 (a)(2)
was not applicable. 9
The court clearly held that, where an insurable interest is the subject of
multiple policies, each containing an excess insurance clause, the excess
insurance clause of each policy is inoperative and no one policy is primarily
liable.0 However, the state of the law in Virginia with regard to loss appor-
tionment among insurance contracts containing excess insurance clauses
remains uncertain. The Virginia Supreme Court tangentially recognized
the pro rata method of loss apportionment, although the failure to do so
in an affirmative manner will certainly give rise to future litigation until
the issue is conclusively resolved. In light of the abundance of litigation
on this issue in other jurisdictions, it was incumbent upon the Virginia
Supreme Court to resolve this issue in order to forestall future unnecessary
and expensive litigation.
Paul K. Campsen
59. Id.
60. 241 S.E.2d at 762.
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